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ABSTRACT 
In the corporate finance tradition starting with Berle & Means (1923), corporations should 
generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) generally considers CSR as a managerial agency problem and a waste of corporate resources, since 
corporate insiders do good with other people’s money. We evaluate this agency view using large-scale 
datasets with global coverage (59 countries) on firm-level corporate engagement and compliance with 
respect to environmental, social, and governance issues. Using an instrumental variable approach, we 
document that CSR ratings are higher for companies with fewer agency problems (using standard 
proxies such as having lower levels of free cash flow and higher dividend payout and leverage ratios). 
Moreover, certain aspects of CSR (e.g., environmental, labor and social protection) are associated with 
increased executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and the maximization of shareholder value. 
Key words: corporate social responsibility, agency problems, value enhancement, corporate 
governance  
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Socially Responsible Firms 
“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply 
legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it 
and not merely for its individual members, that they are… trustees for an 
institution [with multiple constituents] rather than attorneys for the stockholders.”  
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. Harvard Law Review, 1932 
I. Introduction 
The desirability of corporations engaging in “socially responsible” behavior has long been hotly debated 
among economists, lawyers, and business experts. Back in the 1930s, two American lawyers, Adolf A. 
Berle Jr and E. Merrick Dodd Jr., had a famous public debate on the issue of “to whom are corporations 
accountable?” Berle argued that the management of a corporation should only be held accountable to 
shareholders for their actions whereas Dodd argued that corporations were accountable to both the 
society in which they operated and their shareholders (Macintosh, 1999). The lasting interest in this 
debate reflects the fact that the issues it raises touch on the basic role and function of corporations in a 
capitalist society.  
Two general views, often reflecting the issues raised in the Berle-Dodd debate, on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) prevail in the literature. The CSR “value-enhancing view” argues that socially 
responsible firms, such as firms that promote efforts to help protect the environment, promote social 
equality, improve community relationships, can and often do adhere to value-maximizing corporate 
governance practices. Indeed, well-governed firms are more likely to be socially responsible. In short, 
CSR can be consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as well as achieving broader societal goals. 
Some proponents of the value-enhancing view further argue that firm value maximization can 
incorporate stakeholder value, and not merely shareholder value (e.g., Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). The 
opposite view on CSR begins with Milton Friedman’s (1970) well-known claim that ‘the only social 
responsibility of corporations is to make money’. Extending this view, several researchers argue that 
CSR is often simply a manifestation of managerial agency problems inside the firm (Benabou and Tirole, 
2010; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2013) and hence problematic (“agency view”). That is to say, socially 
responsible firms tend to suffer from agency problems which enable managers to engage in CRS that 
benefits themselves at the expense of shareholders (Krueger, 2013). Furthermore, managers engaged in 
time-consuming CSR activities may lose focus on their core managerial responsibilities (Jensen, 2001). 
Overall, according to the agency view, CSR is generally not in the interests of shareholders. Friedman 




foundations of a free society” (1970). Of course, reality might lie somewhere between the value-
enhancing and agency views of CSR. Some CSR related corporate policies may be shareholder value-
enhancing whereas others may be driven by agency problems. 
The empirical literature testing these two views is mixed and thus has left the issues raised in the 
Berle-Dodd debate largely unresolved. For instance, a number of papers document that firm 
participation in certain social issues—such as not engaging with ‘sin’ industries, avoiding nuclear energy, 
and charity giving—is negatively associated with shareholder wealth maximization (e.g., Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Brown, Helland, and Smith, 2006; Navarro, 1988; Brammer and Millington, 2008; Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky, 2013). In a recent study based on the KLD dataset, Cheng et al. (2013) find empirical 
evidence supporting the argument that managers of large US firms enjoy private benefits from investing 
in CSR. On the other hand, other papers document – largely using the same KLD dataset – that a higher 
CSR score is on average associated with lower idiosyncratic risk and a lower probability of financial 
distress (Lee and Faff, 2009; Goss, 2009), a lower cost of capital (Goss and Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011; Albuquerque, Durnev, and 
Koskinen, 2013), more positive sell-side analysts’ recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a; 
Bushee, 2000; Bushee & Noe, 2001; Eccles, Krzus, and Serafeim, 2011), and higher abnormal returns 
and long-term post-acquisition returns (Deng et al., 2013).  
The CSR empirical literature to date has two major limitations. First, much of the literature is largely 
focused only on the ex post effects of CSR. That is, the principal research focus is measuring shareholder 
reactions’ to CSR as captured by abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 2013), the cost 
of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011), and ownership changes (e.g., Cheng et al., 2013), or on the 
financial consequences of CSR spending (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009). However, both the value-enhancing 
and agency views are concerned to a significant extent with managerial incentives, which are ex ante in 
nature. More specifically, in the agency view, the managerial incentive to engage in CSR is a reflection of 
the generally poor incentives of managers at socially responsible firms, i.e. these firms suffer from 
agency problems. These agency problems then manifest themselves in the form of CSR activities. 
Conversely, according to the value-enhancing view, well-run firms, meaning firms where management is 
generally properly incentivized, will tend to have managers engaging in appropriate CRS conduct. In this 
way, the debate over CSR connects up with the general corporate finance literature on agency problems 
and managerial incentives, a fact that we will exploit in our empirical analyses. Second, the objective 
function being maximized is often implicitly assumed in the literature to be exclusively shareholder 
wealth maximization, without any independent importance being placed on third party effects. In this 




concerned with shareholders. Given differing opinions concerning the appropriate objective function 
within the literature, an important research question is whether well-governed firms are more likely to be 
socially responsible.  
In this paper, we take a comprehensive look at the CSR agency and value-enhancing views around 
the globe. By means of a rich and partly proprietary CSR dataset with global coverage across a large 
number of countries and covering thousands of the largest global companies, we test these two views by 
examining whether traditional corporate finance proxies for firm agency problems, such as capital 
spending cash flows, managerial compensation arrangements, ownership structures, and country-level 
investor protection laws, account for firms’ CRS activities. Based on this comprehensive analysis we fail 
to find evidence that CSR conduct is a function of firm agency problems. Rather, consistent with the 
value-enhancing view, well-governed firms are more likely to be socially responsible. CSR is associated 
with managerial pay-for-performance and maximization of firm value, which supports the value-
enhancing view that CSR in general is not inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II identifies several proxies drawn from the corporate 
finance literature for firm agency problems and their possible relationship to CSR. Section III describes 
the samples and specifications we will use when testing the CSR agency view. Section IV reports and 
discusses the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Agency Theory and CSR: Hypotheses 
Agency problems manifest themselves through non-value-maximizing investment choices (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1989; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000) and managerial pay that is not tied 
to performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Economists have focused on possible mechanisms 
constraining these agency problems, such as contract design, incentive systems, and internal controls (see 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Prendergast (1999), and Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) for reviews), as 
well as on external mechanisms such as labor, capital, and product markets (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), and institutional arrangements, including legal rules (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
Ex Ante Agency Problems 
First, we will explore in our analysis hypotheses based on agency theory at the firm-level in the spirit 




governance literature (Morck & Yeung, 2005). Agency theory focuses on managers’ ex-ante incentives. 
More specifically, according to this literature, agency problems can be particularly acute when the firm 
generates substantial free cash-flows in excess of those required to finance all positive NPV projects 
(Servaes and Tamayo, 2014) leading to serious agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers and Rajan, 1998). According to this literature, when liquid assets are abundant, 
firms do not have to submit to the scrutiny of the capital markets that occurs when new capital is needed, 
and the managers have discretion to invest the funds as they please. On the other hand, dividends (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Morck and Yeung, 2005) and debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), given 
their demands on cash flow, can constrain managers from diverting cash or committing cash to 
unprofitable projects that generate private benefits to insiders. When cash is tight managers will be 
motivated to run the firm efficiently, which can increase shareholder value (La Porta et al., 2000). 
This literature focusing on free cash flow creating an agency problem suggests a causal effect 
running from corporate liquidity and leverage to managerial incentives to divert firm value to generate 
private benefits (Jensen, 1986). This suggests the following hypothesis reflecting the CSR agency view: a 
higher level of CSR is induced by higher cash holdings, free cash flows, and capital expenditure, and 
lower leverage and dividend payout. This hypothesis is consistent with the contention that CSR usually 
requires long-term investments that do not necessarily contribute to shareholder value maximization but 
do contribute to managers’ private benefits of control (Cheng et al., 2013). In contrast, the CSR value-
enhancing view suggests the opposite hypothesis: CSR should be associated with fewer agency concerns 
and better managerial decisions, thus higher leverage and lower liquidity (cash and free-cash flows) 
(Krueger, 2013). The latter hypothesis is consistent with the agency theory view that when cash is tight, 
the firm tends to be better governed as the manager is motivated to run the firm efficiently. Both 
hypotheses, it is worth noting, are based on the ex-ante incentives of managers as identified in the 
corporate finance literature: the abundance or scarcity of cash creates bad or good managerial incentives. 
Second, we consider this ex ante agency literature from a managerial incentive-performance 
perspective in the spirit of Jensen and Murphy (1990), and hence investigate hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between CSR and managerial pay-for-performance. In the corporate finance literature, 
executive compensation helps align the interests of managers and of shareholders, and higher pay-
performance sensitivity leads to less severe agency problems (and thus shareholder value-enhancement). 
Therefore, weak managerial pay-for-performance can be viewed as a proxy for agency problems at the 
firm (“pay without performance”, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Accordingly, the CSR value-enhancing 
view would hypothesize that CSR is associated with stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity whereas 




Investor Protection Laws and CSR 
Of course, CSR and agency problems can emerge simultaneously as they are both choices of the 
firm in some sense. This simultaneity (or endogeneity) creates an obvious empirical challenge for 
investigating the relationship between CSR and firm agency problems. Several studies resort to policy 
and market-wide shocks as quasi-experiments to help identify a causal relationship between CSR and 
agency proxies (e.g., Hong et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2013; Flammer, 2013), but this approach is hard to 
apply in a multi-country context. Therefore, we employ exogenous variation in country-level laws as 
instrumental variables for firm-level agency problems. The relevant country-level laws are those that 
provide legal protection of shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 2000). Broadly speaking, the laws that aim 
at addressing agency problems and investor expropriation concern corporate decision-making and voting 
(corporate law), information disclosure in securities transactions (securities law), and regulation of related 
parties transactions (anti-self-dealing law), as well as the effectiveness of their enforcement (La Porta et 
al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008).  
If these country-level laws help constrain firm-level agency problems, then being a firm in a country 
with such laws can be viewed as a proxy for fewer firm-level agency problems. Just as with free-cash 
flow, leverage, pay-for-performance, and dividend payouts, we will therefore use country-level laws as a 
proxy for firm-level agency problems in exploring the CSR agency and value-enhancing views. Again, the 
CSR value-enhancing view would hypothesize that firms in countries with strong legal protections will 
engage in more CSR relative to firms in countries with weak protections. The CSR agency view would 
predict the opposite. 
Large Shareholders and CSR 
In countries other than the United States, the U.K., Canada, and Australia, large firms typically have 
shareholders that own a significant fraction of equity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). It is worth noting that ownership patterns are very stable in 
general, especially outside the United States, and are shaped largely by the companies’ histories and their 
founding/controlling families (La Porta et al., 2002). Therefore, large shareholders’ ownership 
concentration could also be considered as largely exogenous to particular decisions of a firm (Faccio and 
Lang, 2002). 
The association between the level of concentrated ownership and firm-level agency problems is 
theoretically unclear. On the one hand, ownership in the hands of one or a few large shareholders could 
create agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders (Bozec & Laurin, 2008; Bebchuk 




shareholder. The possibility of diversion, and hence this type of agency problem, can be heightened as 
the firm’s free cash flow increases and leverage and dividend payouts decrease (as there is now more to 
divert). On the other hand, the controlling shareholders can effectively steer manager decision making, 
and hence also function as a mechanism to curb managerial agency problems. Once again, country-level 
laws (corporate, securities, and anti-self-dealing laws) can help constrain the agency problem created by 
controlling shareholders and thus can be used a proxy for agency costs for this reason.  
III. Data and Methodology 
CSR Data 
Our data provide information on both the legally mandated and the voluntarily initiated aspects of 
CSR. Our primary data on CSR are from MSCI’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database and the 
Vigeo corporate ESG database. Both databases are built by means of different proprietary data sources 
and employ different rating metrics, which enables us to cross-validate our results. The IVA indices 
measure a corporation’s environmental and social risks and opportunities, and are compiled using 
company profiles, ratings, scores, and industry reports, and are available from 1999 to 2011. Its coverage 
comprises the top 1,500 companies of the MSCI World Index (expanding to the full MSCI World Index 
over the course of the sample period); the top 25 companies of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index; the 
top 275 companies by market cap of the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250 (excluding investment trusts); and 
the ASX 200. For this large sample with global coverage, MSCI constructs a series of 29 Environmental, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) scores2 covering the following categories: (1) Strategic governance, which 
relates to traditional corporate governance concerns and whether the firm adopts or has the ability to 
adopt certain strategic governance strategies; (2) Human capital, which concerns labor relations as well as 
employees’ motivation and health safety; (3) Stakeholder capital, which concerns relationships with 
customers, suppliers, and local communities; (4) Products and services that relates to product safety and 
intellectual capital product development; (5) Emerging markets, which concerns issues related to human 
rights, child and forced labor, and oppressive regimes arising from firms’ trade and operations in 
emerging markets; (6) Environmental risk factors, which include environmental-based liabilities based on 
operating risks, industry-specific carbon risks, and performance in leading sustainability risk indicators; 
                                                  
2 A key ESG issue is defined as an environmental and/or social externality that has the potential to become internalized by 
the industry or the company through one or more of the following triggers: (a) Pending or proposed regulation; (b) A 
potential supply constraint; (c) A notable shift in demand; (d) A major strategic response by an established competitor; (e) 
Growing public awareness or concerns. Once up to five key issues have been selected, analysts work with sector team leaders 
to make any necessary adjustments to the weightings in the model. Each key issue typically comprises 10-30% of the total 
IVA rating. The weightings take into account the impact of companies, their supply chains, and their products and the 
financial implications of these impacts, illustrated in the Appendix. On each key ESG issue, a wide range of data are collected 




(7) Environmental management capacity, which includes environmental audit, accounting, reporting, 
training, certification, and product materials; (8) Environmental opportunity factors such as the firm’s 
competence in embedding certain environmental opportunities in their strategies. Among all these 29 
sub-dimensions, Labor Relations, Industry-Specific Carbon Risk, Environmental Opportunity categories receive 
the highest weights in a firm’s global rating (they add up to 80%). Furthermore, the IVA ratings are 
complemented with the RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the RiskMetrics Social Rating scores, which are 
provided by RiskMetrics Group (now part of MSCI) and capture the environmental and social aspects of 
CSR, respectively. Companies in the sample are rated from CCC to AAA, which we then transform into 
numeric ratings from 0 to 6. The whole IVA sample (including the RiskMetrics ratings) covers 91,373 
firm-time observations from 59 countries.  
The Vigeo corporate ESG data set focuses more on CSR compliance, as it applies a check-the-box 
approach to rate how a firm and the country where it operates comply with the conventions, guidelines, 
and declarations by international organizations such as UN, ILO, and OECD. The Vigeo ratings cover 
six evaluation categories: (1) environment, (2) human rights, (3) human resources, (4) business behavior 
(which concerns relationship with suppliers and customers), (5) community involvement, and (6) 
traditional corporate governance. These six domains are further broken down into 38 ESG criteria 
(sustainability drivers and risk factors) based on universally defined social responsibility objectives and 
managerial action principles. The range of indices used by Vigeo include: Euronext Vigeo World 120, 
Euronext Vigeo Europe 120, Euronext Vigeo Eurozone 120, Euronext Vigeo US 50, Euronext Vigeo 
France 20, Euronext Vigeo United Kingdom 20 and Euronext Vigeo Benelux 20, and are updated every 
six months. The whole Vigeo sample covers 7,048 firm-time observations from 28 countries and 36 
sectors. Both the MSCI sample and the Vigeo sample cover the well-established equity indices of the 
largest companies across the world, rather than just select a specific sample of firms that engage in CSR. 
An important note is that for both the MSCI and Vigeo samples, firms are rated relative to their 
industry peers from both domestic and international markets, thus the ratings do not depend on the 
cross-country difference in jurisdiction, regulation, and the local CSR situation. This makes our cross-
country data more credible and helps guaranteeing that our CSR ratings are not biased by country-
specific characteristics. In addition, we supplement our proprietary CSR data with the publicly available 
ASSET4 data from Thomson Reuters—also with global coverage—to further verify our results. The 
detailed descriptions of the MSCI IVA and the Vigeo ESG samples are shown in Appendix 1a and 1b, 
and their country distributions (as well as that of ASSET4) are shown in Appendix 2a-c. 
Finally, we obtained a cross-sectional dataset on country-level sustainability ratings from Vigeo, 




responsibility (commitment to and performance in environmental protection), (2) institutional 
responsibility (rule of law and governance), and (3) social responsibility and solidarity (commitment to 
protecting human rights, political and economic freedom, and other social issues). These three country-
level domains echo the firm-level ‘E’, ’S’, and ’G’, respectively. The metrics of the Vigeo country-level 
sustainability index and the MSCI firm-level ESG ratings are different: the latter measures corporate 
CSR engagement and compliance, whereas the former measures a country’s legal and regulatory 
framework in sustainability and is thus not just an aggregation of firm-level CSR data (see Appendix 3 
for definitions). 
Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to test the effects of proxies for agency problems on CSR. Based on our 
earlier discussion of the academic literature, we utilize five such agency proxies (putting aside for the 
moment managerial compensation): a. capital expenditure (CapEx); b. cash holdings; c. free cash flow 
measured as EBIT after tax minus the change in net assets (CapEx, minus depreciation and amortization, 
plus or minus the change in net working capital); d. dividend payout ratio; and e. leverage, measured as 
the ratio of total debt over total equity. Higher values of the first three variables (a—c) are related to 
agency costs caused by excessive capital spending, and higher values of the last two (d and e) relate to 
mechanisms that can curb managerial agency problems.  
Of course, the issue of endogeneity is as always important to consider. Country-level laws and 
ownership structures, as discussed, can help address this difficult issue by serving as instruments. The 
effects of law and ownership on our five agency proxies have been well documented in the literature. 
For example, countries with better investor protection (e.g., common law countries) have significantly 
fewer cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003), lower free cash flows, lower investment 
sensitivity to cash flows (McLean, Zhang, & Zhao), higher leverage adjustment speeds (Öztekin & 
Flannery, 2012), and higher payouts (La Porta et al., 2000). Given this, we conduct a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) model in which the agency proxies are regressed on country-level laws and ownership 
concentration in the first stage. Subsequently, the predicted value of each proxy enters into the second 
stage regression where CSR is the dependent variable. This model also includes other firm-level 
covariates (ROA, equity market-to-book ratio, interest coverage, short-term investment to cash flow 
sensitivity, financial slack as measured by the current ratio). We also control for industry and time fixed 
effects, because CSR activities are industry-dependent and vary over time. 
The country-level legal protection data come from well-established sources. Regarding the country-




(1998) and revised in Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). For securities law, we use the private 
enforcement index concerning information disclosure and liabilities standard developed by La Porta et al. 
(2006). Since public enforcement was not found to play a significant role in investor protection as in La 
Porta et al. (2006), we do not use it as an IV (the Sargan-Hansen test also suggests that it is not a valid 
IV). For the regulations on self-dealing, we use the anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) developed by Djankov 
et al. (2008), which contains ex ante control of self-dealing, ex post control of self-dealing, and public enforcement 
variables. As suggested by Djankov et al. (2008), the ASDI is better grounded in theory than the anti-
director rights index, and focuses more on insiders’ related-party transactions. We further include the 
one-share one-vote index (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow rights) and the mandatory 
dividend index (percentage of net income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to 
distribute as dividends among ordinary shareholders) as used in Spamann (2010). We conducted the 
Sargan-Hansen over-identification test on the overall validity of our instrumental variables: almost all test 
statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that the IVs are valid. Therefore, our identification strategy and 
the results are robust. Given that our CSR data is constructed in a way so as to be comparative to 
industry peers (that is, the industry effect has already been eliminated by construction), we do not 
control for industry fixed effects but rather cluster standard errors at the industry level.  
Turning to managerial compensation, we test the relation between CSR and managerial pay-for-
performance by regressing executive pay on the CSR indicators, the performance indicators, and their 
interactions, along with other firm-level and country-level covariates. In the literature, executive 
compensation is usually measured as both the cash-based pay (salaries and bonuses) and equity-based 
pay (stock options, restricted stock of Long Term Incentive Plans). The average total compensation of 
all available executives on BoardEx’s Compensation Reports is taken as our dependent variable. The 
main independent variables include the different ESG ratings, Tobin’s Q, and their interactions. 
Following the traditional literature on the determinants of executive compensation (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003), we also include a set of control variables, such as return of assets 
(ROA), the number of employees (Ln(employee)) as a proxy for the physical size of the company, the 
leverage ratio as proxy for creditors’ involvement into the firm, the number of analysts following the 
company (Ln(analyst coverage)) as a proxy for market discipline, and the percentage of a company’s shares 
owned by the largest shareholder. Again, industry- and time- fixed effects and controlled for in all 
regressions. The descriptive statistics of our variables are provided in Table 1. 





IV. Results  
Descriptive Results: Correlations 
We first correlate the country-level sustainability ratings—the country’s environmental 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and social responsibility and solidarity—with the firm-level 
CSR ratings from the MSCI IVA, the Vigeo ESG, and the ASSET4 ESG databases. We do this so as to 
see whether our firm-level CRS measurements are related to country-level sustainability ratings. The 
Pearson correlations coefficients between these firm- and country-level sustainability indices are shown 
in Table 2. On average, the coefficients are around 20 to 30 percent, which are high given that the 
country-level and the firm-level ratings use completely different rating metrics. The correlation between 
Vigeo’s ‘human resource concern’ and ‘country institutional responsibility’ is as high as 47 percent, 
which implies that corporate behavior benefiting its employees and properly putting its human resources 
into service is largely governed by the rule of law and country governance. Such high correlations imply 
that our firm-level CSR measurements are in fact closely related to country-level societal sustainability 
ratings.  
We also measure for a US subsample the correlation between our firm-level CSR ratings with 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index (the E-index) which is believed to drive 
corporate governance quality. The E-index consists of 6 governance provisions—staggered board, limits 
to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes. The correlations between the 
E-index and the CSR scores for our US subsample are rather low (merely 6%) and negative, which 
suggests that CSR is not adopted by an entrenched management and hence expresses an agency problem. 
We perform a more thorough analysis of this issue in the regression analysis of the next section. 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Regression Results 
In Table 3, we examine the relationship between CSR and our five agency proxies: cash holdings, 
free cash flow, CapEx, dividend payout ratio, and leverage. The agency view predicts a positive relation 
between CSR and the first three proxies and a negative relationship for the last two. The value-
enhancing view on CSR predicts the opposite. 
Panel A shows the regression results for the MSCI IVA sample, and Panel B shows those for the 




shareholder protection measures and the firm-level ownership concentration. One important note is that 
the correlations between the five proxies are rather small, ranging from -0.8% to 23% for both the MSCI 
IVA and the Vigeo ESG samples, thus mitigating multicollinearity concerns. In the second stage, CSR 
ratings are regressed on the five “predicted” agency proxies as estimated from the first stage, and on the 
other control variables, with bootstrapping-adjusted standard errors. As we are interested in testing the 
CSR agency view, we only report the second-stage results. The dependent variables in Panel A are the 
Overall IVA Ratings (covering all ESG dimensions), the RiskMetrics EcoValue Ratings (focusing on 
ecological efficiencies), the RiskMetrics Social Ratings (focusing on social issues), as well as the three sub-
indices that receive the highest weights: Labor Relations, Industry-specific Carbon Risks, and Environmental 
Opportunities, and three aggregate subscores: Strategic Governance (including traditional governance), Human 
Capital, and Stakeholder Capital. We switch between using ROA and Tobin’s Q (measured by the equity 
market-to-book ratio), and between unwinsorized and winsorized dividend payout ratio to cross-validate 
our results. The dependent variables in Panel B are the Overall Vigeo ESG, Environment, Human Resource, 
Human Rights, Community Involvement, Customers & Suppliers, and Corporate Governance.  
In Panel A, the coefficients on the three liquidity-focused agency proxies—cash holdings, free cash 
flows, and capital expenditures—are mostly negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficients 
on the financial constraint-focused agency proxies – dividend payouts and leverage are mostly positive. 
These findings therefore do not support the CSR agency view. The economic significance is large: one 
percent decrease in the cash holdings to assets ratio or in free-cash flows to assets ratio leads to an 
average change of more than half a grade in the ESG ratings (which are on a scale of 0-6), and a one 
percent change in the CapEx to assets ratio induces a 1 grade change in the ESG rating in most cases. 
For Panel A, we find strong support for the ‘doing good when doing well’ hypothesis, as the coefficients 
on either ROA or market-to-book ratios are mostly positive. In addition, the financial constraint proxies 
are mostly negatively correlated with the ESG ratings, while financial slack (as measured by the current 
ratio) are mostly positively associated with the ESG ratings. Similar patterns are observed in Panel B 
where the Vigeo ESG ratings are the dependent variables, and time fixed effects are controlled for—at 
the rating date level for columns (1)—(5) and at the year-level for columns (6)—(7) so as to check the 
robustness. Once again, these results do not support the CSR agency view.  
We note that for human resources and human rights, country-level legal protection indices seem to 
be weak instruments as the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen test are below 0.1, which may indicate that 
the legal protection of investor rights can also affect human resource and human rights through other 
channels than the agency channel. However, the results for other CSR indicators are mostly consistent 




In terms of causation, the interpretation of our results ought to be done with care. Still, given our 
identification strategy and the Sargan-Hansen’s test statistics which support the validity of our IVs, we 
tend to interpret them as follows: well-governed firms suffer less from agency concerns: when cash is 
tight—less cash reserves, free cash flows and capital spending, and more dividend payouts and interest 
payouts— managers are motivated to run the firm more efficiently and care more about the long run 
through engaging in CSR activities, and are more willing to disburse earnings to shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In Table 4 we examine the relationship between CSR, executive compensation, and firm 
performance. The dependent variable is the average compensation of executives at the firm, and the 
independent variables include CSR scores, Tobin’s Q, and their interaction term, together with other 
control variables that are used in the previous literature on executive compensation. Again, Panel A 
reports the results with CSR measured by MSCI’s IVA ratings, while Panel B reports the results with 
CSR proxied by Vigeo’s ESG ratings. As mentioned before, the agency view argues that CSR activities 
will be associated with reduced managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity, and thus predicts a negative 
effect of the interaction between CSR and performance on managerial pay. The value-enhancing view 
argues that CSR strengthens pay-for-performance, and thus predicts a positive sign of the interaction 
term.  
The results on pay-for-performance again reject the agency view, but support the value-enhancing 
view. The coefficients on the interaction terms between CSR (overall IVA, environmental, social) 
performance and firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) are consistently positive, which indicates that engaging in 
CSR is actually associated with increased pay-for-performance sensitivity. The economic effects are non-
trivial: the effects of performance on pay (scaled by total assets) in more socially responsible firms (with 
one-grade higher in CSR ratings) are on average 10% higher than less socially responsible firms. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant in the regression with social ratings with 
the CSR measure, which may potentially imply that social issues such as human rights are relatively 
peripheral to firm performance, thus are not priced in managerial compensation. The coefficients on 
leverage are mostly negative, which confirm to the disciplinary role of debt: leverage can reduce the 
likelihood of managerial entrenchment through monitoring by creditors and the threat that the CEO 
loses his job following bankruptcy-induced liquidation.  




Our interpretation of these regression results largely hinges on the assumption that our instruments 
are valid, that legal protection of shareholder rights and ownership concentration affect CSR through 
addressing agency concerns, rather than via other channels. With respect to our instruments, one may 
argue—as do, for example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)—that 
ownership structure might also be endogenously determined and is thus also a choice variable. To deal 
with the potential endogeneity of ownership to corporate policies, we also instrument the ownership 
variable with legal protection indices that were used before—ADRI, ASDI, private enforcement of 
securities law, the revised one-share one-vote rule (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) 
index, the revised mandatory dividend index, and the direct ownership of large shareholders. Reverse 
causality is not of concern because legal protection is clearly exogenous to CSR. In unreported tests, the 
results are very similar to those in Table 3, in that liquidity-focused agency proxies are mostly negatively 
correlated with CSR, while the coefficients on dividend payouts and leverage have a positive sign.  
Even if legal protection were a weak instrument and were to affect CSR through unobservable 
channels other than the agency channel (for example, through difficult to quantify cultural norms), the 
coefficients’ signs still would not support the agency view. Even if other unobservable factors exist, the 
CSR agency view will still predict a positive and significant correlation between the abundance of cash 
and CSR; as long as the coefficients are not positive and significant, the agency view is unsubstantiated.  
Direct effects of country-level investor protection on CSR 
Given that the direct relation between legal protection and CSR is of independent interest, we 
regress CSR ratings on various legal protection indices and report the results in Table 5. We proxy the 
degree of shareholder-orientation embedded in company law by means of the ADRI index as adjusted 
by Spamann (2010). The legal rules on constraining insiders’ self-dealing are proxied by the ASDI and 
the public enforcement index, developed by Djankov et al. (2008). We do not report the parameter 
estimates of the control variables which comprise cash holdings (scaled by total assets), leverage ratio, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, financial constraints, interest coverage, current ratio, ownership dispersion (the Bureau 
van Dijck’s independence indicator), as well as industry- and time-fixed effects, to save space.  
According to the CSR agency view, stronger legal protection of shareholder rights, as proxied by 
ADRI (the aggregation of six shareholder protection rules), should reduce the incentive and ability of 
corporate insiders (directors and officers) to extract private benefits through CSR-related spending. In 
contrast, the CSR value-enhancing view predicts that CSR-spending is positively related to shareholder 
protection, as managers under stricter laws are motivated to generate more shareholder value through 




significantly, positively predict firms’ CSR engagement (Panel A, the MSCI IVA sample). As a 
robustness test, we include the original ADRI from LLSV (1998) and the revised ADRI from Djankov 
et al. (2008), and decompose the anti-self-dealing index into ex ante private control which concerns the 
approval process and mandatory extensive disclosure, and ex post private control which concerns the ease 
of proving wrongdoing (for definitions, see the Appendix and Djankov et al. (2008)), into our models 
and find that our above results survive. The persistent positive correlations between corporate law and 
CSR suggest that when legal rules are stronger in disciplining corporate behavior towards “good conduct” 
for investors, especially minority shareholders (as both ADRI and anti-self-dealing indices mainly 
concern minority shareholder protection against corporate insiders and controlling shareholders), firms 
are also more likely engage in social responsibilities. Furthermore, the coefficients of explanatory 
variables of these tests do not differ much from those in the 2SLS regressions, indicating that agency 
concerns are the main/only channel through which legal protection of shareholder rights affect CSR. In 
Panel B where the dependent variables are the Vigeo ESG ratings that focus more on CSR compliance 
(rather than on the CSR practice or engagement of Panel A), company law (the adjusted ADRI) still 
plays a positive role, but the anti-self-dealing rules do not. The insignificance of the coefficients on the 
anti-self-dealing index and the public enforcement of self-dealing index is not that surprising, given that 
the two indices measure transactions while compliance to CSR standards mainly concerns the firm’s daily 
operations, such as sticking to labor regulations and obtaining an ISO14000 certification, rather than 
(intercorporate) transactions that are measured by the anti-self-dealing index.  
[Insert Table 5 about Here]  
Direct effects of large shareholders’ ownership and control on CSR 
It is also interesting to investigate the direct association between ownership structure and CSR 
policies. The previous tests mostly concern managerial agency problems, but controlling shareholders 
can also engage in rent extraction which constitutes another type of agency problem (“large shareholder 
agency problem”). With respect to CSR spending, prior research suggests that large shareholders may 
have conflicting interests with minority shareholders (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Benabou and Tirole, 
2010; Cheng et al., 2013). However, the existence of both the convergence-of-interest effect and the 
entrenchment effect (of major shareholders) complicates the relationship between large shareholders’ 
ownership stakes and CSR practice. In general, CSR is costly for shareholders if perceived as an agency 
problem, and therefore higher cash-flow rights (ownership stakes) should lead - other things equal - to 
lower CSR expenditure, because large shareholders also internalize the costs of CSR (e.g. McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). Consequently, one would expect a negative relationship between large shareholders’ 




the incentive effect derived from cash flow rights (ownership stakes). Some argue, in contrast, that 
higher insider ownership makes these insiders more powerful in decision making thus more entrenched, 
resulting in an increased ability of insiders to overinvest in CSR. Therefore, the relation between large 
shareholders’ ownership and CSR performance is non-monotonic in nature, which makes a direct testing 
of large shareholders’ ownership on CSR difficult to interpret from the agency cost perspective. 
One way to circumvent this problem is to disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of 
large shareholders on CSR, which is usually achieved through separating control rights from cash flow 
rights. Controlling shareholders can establish control over firms with only minimal cash-flow rights 
(ownership) when a deviation from the ‘one share, one vote’ rule applies (La Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000; Classens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Lins, 2003). According to Bebchuk et al. (2000), such separation can create agency costs an order 
of magnitude larger than the costs associated with a controlling shareholder who also has a majority of 
the cash-flow rights in her own corporation. A similar approach has been used by Claessens et al. (2002), 
in which they separate the largest shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow rights, and find that firm 
value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive 
incentive effect, but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-
flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect.  
We test the effects of the largest shareholder’s voting rights in excess of its cash-flow rights on CSR 
and use the ASSET4 sample, which comprises standardized data on largest shareholder’s voting rights 
and cash flow rights for a set of global companies. Our model specifications follow those of Claessens et 
al. (2002), Morck et al. (1988), and Bebchuk et al. (2009) in that we capture the non-monotonic effects of 
large shareholders’ cash flow rights. What we have done in addition is that we control for country, 
industry, and year fixed effects (whereas the earlier only controlled for industry dummies). Our main 
explanatory variables are: Wedge1, which is the difference between the largest shareholder’s voting and 
cash flow rights (voting rights minus cash flow rights), and Wedge2, which is the ratio of voting rights 
and cash flow rights. The inclusion of both Largest Shareholder Ownership and its square captures the 
non-monotonic effects of the controlling shareholder. To control for “doing good by doing well”, we 
include the Equity Market-to-Book Ratio as a control but also test other standard control variables (used 
by Claessens et al. (2002) and Bebchuk et al. (2009)). In view of CSR as a large shareholder agency 
problem, the controlling shareholders can use their majority voting rights to expropriate minority 
shareholders by approving CSR projects that only benefit themselves. Therefore, a positive association 




The results from the GLS regressions are shown in Table 6. Some interesting observations can be 
made: First, throughout all specifications, the coefficients on both Wedge1 and Wedge2 are positive and 
significant. A ten-percent increase in the different between voting and cash flow rights on average 
reduces the CSR rating by one. This negative sign does not support the agency view which considers 
CSR spending as a result of controlling shareholders’ entrenchment and expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Second, the effect of the largest shareholder’s ownership seems to be non-monotonic on 
different aspects of CSR, as the coefficients on largest shareholder’s ownership are all negative and 
significant, while that on the square of ownership are all positive. This is consistent with the previous 
literature that both incentive and entrenchment mechanisms of controlling shareholders affect corporate 
outcomes. The simplified specifications (only controlling for equity market-to-book ratio) and the more 
complex ones (including also other traditional financial controls) yield both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar results, although the sample size for the latter shrinks. These results also hold for 
various ESG subindices which we do not report for reasons of conciseness. In terms of control variables, 
the positive coefficients on Equity Market-to-Book mostly support the “doing good by doing well” 
hypothesis. Firm size and year since incorporation also have positive loadings on CSR, indicating that 
larger and more established companies are more likely to engage in social issues. Overall, the direct 
effects of controlling shareholder’s ownership and control (wedge between voting and cash flow rights) 
imply that CSR is not likely to be used as a self-serving tool for controlling shareholders to extract 
private benefits, shirk, or build empires, though large shareholders do reduce their spending on CSR due 
to the internalization of its costs. This reflects that a CSR policy is expensive, but does not by itself 
provide support for the agency view.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
CSR, Agency Problems, and Shareholder Value 
Finally, we consider the association between CSR, agency problems and shareholder value 
altogether in a cross-country setting, which has not been explored in the extant literature of “doing well 
by doing good”. To further explore the role of CSR in facilitating value-enhancement and triangulate our 
previous results, we test whether CSR could counter-balance the negative effects of agency problems 
and poor corporate governance on firm value. To do so, we utilize the rich coverage of corporate 
governance provisions in the ASSET4 ESG sample, and construct a global entrenchment index (“global 
E-index”) as a proxy for poor governance. Our global E-index is constructed following the structure of 
the original US-based E-index as in Bebchuk et al. (2009). We have tried our best to mimic the exact 
construct of the original E-index by applying the same governance provisions across countries; only 




provisions in our global E-index include the presence of: (1) a poison pill; (2) a golden parachute; (3) a 
classified board, (4) other anti-takeover devices, and (5) supermajority requirements for both amending 
charters and amending bylaws.3 It is worth noting that ‘classified board’ is a general term which refers to 
the situation that the terms of board directors can be different from each other, while another concept, 
namely ’staggered board’, refers to the situation when the terms of board directors are uniform. Though 
these are different entries in Datastream, such difference does not seem to matter for our regression 
results. 
We conduct our test on a panel dataset of more than 4,700 largest public firms from 60 countries in 
the ASSET4 sample from 2002 to 2013. The dependent variable for all specifications is Tobin’s Q, 
defined as the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity, winsorized at the 5% level. 
The key explanatory variables are the global E-index, the CSR rating (which is measured by ASSET4’s 
overall CSR score, environmental score, and social score, respectively), and an interaction between the 
E-index and CSR (Entrenchment Index × CSR). If CSR enhances firm value, it can counterbalance the 
negative impact of managerial agency problems as proxied by the E-index. Therefore, we expect a 
negative coefficient of the E-index, a positive coefficient of CSR, and a positive coefficient of their 
interaction. We use standard financial controls, such as firm size (measured as Log(Assets)), the largest 
shareholder’s cash flow rights and its square, return on equity (ROE), leverage ratio, capital expenditure, 
dividend per share, as well as year dummies, country dummies, and industry dummies (based on 
Thomson Reuter’s industry classification). Panel A shows the results from the whole ASSET4 sample 
(worldwide sample). While some may be concerned that the entrenchment index is more relevant for 
dispersed ownership structure, we also show in Panel B the results from the subsample of companies in 
the U.S., U.K., and Australia, and in Panel C the results from the subsample of more countries with 
dispersed ownership as classified by La Porta et al. (1999), which further includes Canada, Ireland, 
Switzerland, and Japan.  
The coefficients on the three measures of our global E-index are mostly negatively associated with 
Tobin’s Q throughout all panels, which is in line with that of the original E-index and confirms that our 
new index functions similarly with respect to firm value. The main effects of various CSR ratings are 
mostly positive in Panel A, suggesting that higher CSR rating is associated with higher firm value. The 
most interesting results are on the interaction term between CSR and the global E-index: for almost all 
CSR ratings (environmental, social, and overall), the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
                                                  
3 Inevitably, there are missing values for some firms in some years from Datastream, and we either treat these missing values 
as “missing” (Entrenchment Index 1), or treat these missing values as “zeros” (Entrenchment Index 2). As a further 
robustness check of our “global E-index”, we create Entrenchment Index 3 by replacing “classified board” in Entrenchment 




This reinforces our earlier findings supporting the value-enhancing view rather than the agency view, 
and suggests that CSR rather than being an agency problem, can actually attenuate the negative effects of 
agency problems (managerial entrenchment) on firm value. Similar results are found in Panels B and C 
when we focus on dispersed ownership countries, which confirm our previous findings based on the 
world sample. Of course, potential endogeneity issues may still exist, and unfortunately there might be 
no readily single instrumental variable that capture all aspects of CSR as well as of “entrenchment”. 
Therefore, our interaction results should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, corporate charters 
and bylaws are very stable over time (Bebchuk et al., 2009), which could partly eliminate endogeneity 
concerns, and the pure correlations between “CSR × Entrenchment” at least offer no ground for 
justifying the agency view.  
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
V. Conclusion 
In most Anglo-American countries, there is consensus that corporate governance is about “how 
investors get the managers to give them back their money” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 738). Corporate 
social responsibility, because of its focus on stakeholders in addition to shareholders, is often considered 
as cash diversion and an agency problem. In contrast to this view, is the value-enhancing CSR view in 
which CSR activities can be consistent with maximizing firm value. In this debate it is important to note 
that legal rules and ownership structures are very different outside the Anglo-American world, which 
significantly influences the executives’ incentives, the fiduciary duties of the management and the board 
of directors, as well as the decision making process. The debate on the role of corporate social 
responsibility therefore often reflects the varieties of capitalism across countries and the boundaries of 
the firm. 
In this paper, we utilize public and proprietary data on corporate compliance and engagement in 
stakeholder issues to comprehensively trade off the prominent agency view against the value-enhancing 
view of CSR. Our empirical set-up is well-grounded in fundamental economic theory: incentives, 
information asymmetry, and control. We do not find empirical evidence that CSR is associated with ex 
ante agency concerns, such as abundance of cash and a weak connection between managerial pay and 
corporate performance. Rather, higher CSR performance is closely related to tighter cash—usually a 
proxy for better-disciplined managerial practice in the traditional corporate finance literature (Jensen, 
1986)—and higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. In addition, firms in countries with better legal 
protection on shareholder rights receive higher CSR ratings. Moreover, the relation between CSR and 




counterbalance the negative effects of managerial entrenchment, and lead to higher shareholder value as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q. Our empirical results (based on an instrumental variables-estimation) suggest that 
good governance causes high CSR, and that a firm’s CSR practice is consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Therefore, our findings support the positive stance on CSR, which is also found in 
Dimson et al. (2013), Deng et al. (2013), and Ioannou & Serafeim (2010, 2012).  
While the vast majority of the literature has emphasized the agency costs of managerial 
entrenchment and large shareholders’ control, as well as their economic consequences such as distorting 
resource allocation and impeding economic growth, our empirical findings show that these costs are at 
least not made through CSR activities. Rather, as shown in our results based on the self-constructed 
global entrenchment index, CSR engagement can actually counterbalance the negative impact of 
entrenchment and agency problems on firm value. In fact, the high correlations of CSR ratings and 
country-level sustainability ratings (which incorporate economic development and governance) may 
imply that CSR activities in general are conducive to achieving sustainable development (Moon, 2007). 
Of course, none of this is to say that more CSR is always better. Undertaking some CSR activities may 
indeed be driven by managerial utility considerations, such as the satisfaction of some personal or moral 
imperative of the manager, rather than the enhancement of shareholder wealth (Moser and Martin, 2012). 
Moreover, shareholders always internalize the costs of CSR expenditures, and as their ownership stakes 
increase, they reduce spending on CSR. Our main argument is that in general, corporate social 
responsibility need not to be inevitably induced by agency problems, but can actually preserve a core 
value of capitalism—generating more returns to investors—through enhancing firm value and 
shareholder wealth.  
If we take the evidence in this paper at face value, several policy implications emerge for the 
improvement of corporate governance, particularly in the area of corporate social responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, governments have their responsibility of dealing with market failures and externalities, but 
the government may not always be incentivized and effective in achieving this goal—governments can 
be corrupt, inefficient, and even predatory to private sectors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), in which case 
they fail to provide public goods. Therefore, corporate social responsibility in private sectors—the 
private provision of public goods (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012)—becomes necessary for 
preserving social welfare. While many researchers believe that such private provision of public goods 
may be associated with agency problems that divert shareholder wealth and even undermine the 
foundations of capitalist spirits, we cast doubt on such belief. Corporate governance reforms should take 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A. MSCI IVA sample and Vigeo ESG sample 
Variables 
MSCI IVA sample Vigeo ESG sample 
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cash holdings (scaled by assets) 77,061 0.075 0.045 0.086 0 0.994 5,995 0.076 0.051 0.081 0 0.787 
Free cash flows (scaled by assets) 65,728 0.059 0.057 0.073 -1.362 1.565 4,804 0.105 0.094 0.068 -0.368 0.611 
Capital expenditure (scaled by assets) 67,091 0.052 0.042 0.046 0 1.037 4,984 0.049 0.040 0.043 0 0.498 
Dividend payout ratio 55,670 0.816 0.288 13.766 -70.176 598.420 3,744 0.573 4.817 0.364 -82.172 211.000 
Leverage ratio (winsorized) 78,004 0.615 0.613 0.208 0.228 0.955 5,877 6.466 0.094 118.485 0 3967.62 
ROA (winsorized) 74,993 0.050 0.043 0.044 -0.02 0.149 5,876 0.050 0.040 0.057 -0.414 0.517 
Equity market-to-book (winsorized) 76,417 2.820 2.247 1.875 0.790 8.045 6,766 2.571 1.935 1.938 0.620 8.020 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 72,949 0.677 0.445 0.688 0.042 2.702 5,904 0.326 0.322 0.198 0.028 0.712 
Financial constraints (winsorized) 62,076 0.264 0.006 0.495 0 1.832 4,738 0.296 0.035 0.500 0 1.784 
Interest coverage (winsorized) 73,948 17.093 5.975 29.411 0.414 122.817 5,821 12.891 5.388 19.369 0.471 79.452 
Financial slacks (current ratio) 63,342 1.721 1.365 1.572 0.038 184.984 4,852 0.850 0.774 0.472 0 6.527 
Direct ownership of large shareholders 54,746 35.572% 23.12% 33.918% 0 100% 6,755 35.314% 23.560% 34.268% 0 100% 
Largest shareholder's total ownership 37,005 22.914% 12.46% 23.274% 0 100% 4,282 23.531% 11.615% 24.147% 0 100% 
Independent director ratio 31,019 0.719 0.727 0.175 0 1 5,052 0.770 0.800 0.155 0 0.962 
Female CEO 74,996 0.014 0 0.119 0 1 5,539 0.017 0 0.128 0 1 
CEO’s international work 74,998 0.437 0 0.496 0 1 5,540 0.424 0 0.494 0 1 
CEO’s overseas education 74,986 0.195 0 0.396 0 1 4,874 0.337 0 0.473 0 1 
Total compensation (thousand USD) 24,049 859.509 404.750 2559.806 5.417 75001 1,611 1089.324 483.500 1956.063 3 16668 
Employees 71,697 41,917 17,245 82,271 0 2,100,000 5,535 58,897 25,898 102,827 0 2,100,000 
Analyst coverage 67,289 14.421 13 7.852 1 54 3,764 18.075 17 8.576 1 51 
Investment opportunities 67,049 0.093 0.047 0.797 -0.043 170.824 4,983 0.085 0.046 0.141 -0.003 2.669 
Blockholders’ direct ownership 54,746 0.356 0.231 0.339 0 1 6,755 0.353 0.236 0.343 0 1 
Largest shareholder’s total ownership 37,005 0.229 0.125 0.233 0 1 4,282 0.235 0.116 0.241 0 1 
Adjusted anti-director rights index 89,765 3.371 4 1.184 2 5 7,006 3.757 4 1.098 2 5 
Anti-self-dealing index 89,947 0.617 0.650 0.212 0.170 1 7,047 0.546 0.500 0.240 0.2 1 
Public enforcement of anti-self-dealing 89,947 0.197 0 0.339 0 1 7,047 0.331 0 0.403 0 1 
Private enforcement of securities law 89,799 0.772 0.747 0.217 0.18 1 7,006 0.655 0.705 0.226 0.18 1 
Revised one-share one-vote index 89,765 0.135 0 0.342 0 1 7,006 0.102 0 0.302 0 1 




Table 1 (Cont). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. ASSET4 Sample 
 Obs Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Wedge1 (voting minus cash flow rights) 20,573 1.165% 0 7.245% -89.84% 99.99% 
Wedge2 (voting over cash flow rights) 20,562 4.039 1 170.790 0 10000 
Largest Shareholder's Ownership 23,797 22.029% 13.6% 19.578% 0 100% 
Largest Shareholder's Voting Rights 20,716 23.590% 14.3% 20.881% 0 100% 
Equity Book-to-Market (winsorized) 46,583 2.359 1.800 1.757 0.500 7.280 
Firm Size (Total Assets) 31,133 3612965 6123 2.15×108 0 3.06×1010 
Firm Age 23,374 34.740 23 31.655 0 185 
Annual Sales Growth Rate (winsorized) 46,799 12.627% 8.16% 21,157% -19.070% 69.830% 
CapEx to Sales Ratio (winsorized) 29,015 0.017 0.001 0.044 2.54×10-6 0.185 
Leverage 31,061 21.081% 15.932% 382.758% -0.034% 67392% 
Dividend Per Share (winsorized) 47,541 4.014 0.345 9.940 0 41 
ROE 31,082 0.117 0.118 2.331 -212.5 141.742 
Entrenchment Index 1 12,132 1.245 1 1.227 0 5 
Entrenchment Index 2 53,472 0.690 0 1.037 0 5 




Table 2. Correlation between Corporate ESG and Country Sustainability 
The MSCI IVA Rating, RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating, and RiskMetrics Social Rating are firm-level ESG scores provided by 
MSCI IVA. The Overall Country Score, Country Environmental Responsibility, Country Institutional Responsibility, and 
Country Social Responsibility and Solidarity are country-level sustainability indices provided by Vigeo. Overall Country Score 
is the average of the other three responsibility domain scores. *** stands for statistical significance at 1% level. 
 










MSCI IVA     
MSCI IVA overall rating 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
RiskMetrics EcoValue21 rating 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 
RiskMetrics Social rating 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
Vigeo ESG     
Overall Vigeo rating 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.11*** 
Human resources rating 0.40*** 0.004 0.47*** 0.35*** 
Environmental rating 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 
Customers & suppliers 0.14*** -0.001 0.18*** 0.09*** 
Corporate governance 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.14*** -0.20*** 
Community involvement 0.17*** -0.005 0.23*** 0.10*** 
Human rights 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 
ASSET4 ESG     
CSR score 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
Environmental score 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 







Table 3. CSR and Agency Concerns: Two Stage Least Square Regressions 
2SLS regression results for various ESG ratings. In the 1st stage regression (not reported), the dependent variables are cash holdings, free cash flows, capital expenditure, dividend payout ratio, and 
leverage, respectively, and the independent variables are the country-level revised anti-director rights index (ADRI) as in Spamann (2009), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) as in Djankov et al. (2008), the 
private enforcement of securities law index as in La Porta et al. (2006), the revised one-share one-vote rule (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) index as in Spamann (2010), the revised 
mandatory waivable dividend index as in Spamann (2010), and the direct ownership of large shareholders who hold more than 5% of the firm’s equity. In the second stage, the dependent variables are 
various ESG ratings, and the independent variables are the “predicted” cash holdings, free cash flows, CapEx, dividend payouts, and leverage, together with other control variables. Standard errors are 
adjusted for the second stage and clustered at the industry level. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings and subdimensional ratings) from the MSCI IVA sample 
Dependent variable (2nd stage): IVA rating EcoValue 
rating 












Cash holding (scaled) -0.216 -0.287*** -0.061 0.110 -0.358*** -0.056 0.118 0.241** 0.063 
 (0.197) (0.082) (0.101) (0.073) (0.080) (0.038) (0.104) (0.112) (0.086) 
Free cash flow (scaled) -0.801* -1.091*** -2.096*** -1.425*** -0.221 -0.629*** -1.050*** -0.512*** -0.344*** 
 (0.432) (0.247) (0.482) (0.311) (0.218) (0.119) (0.271) (0.161) (0.100) 
Capital expenditure (scaled) -2.317* -2.176*** -1.418** -0.832* -0.407* -0.806*** -0.282 -1.038** -0.986*** 
 (1.295) (0.370) (0.634) (0.436) (0.243) (0.154) (0.247) (0.425) (0.302) 
Dividend payout ratio (winsorized) -1.914 -0.062 12.700*** 6.910** 4.195*** 0.169 5.732*** 9.343** 5.248** 
 (1.594) (1.344) (4.490) (3.047) (1.344) (0.628) (2.009) (3.703) (2.433) 
Leverage (winsorized) 0.433** 0.144*** 0.209** 0.127* 0.029 -0.017 0.016 0.064 0.050* 
 (0.219) (0.062) (0.098) (0.067) (0.031) (0.628) (0.032) (0.050) (0.030) 
ROA 1.007** 1.005*** 1.881*** 1.284*** 0.168 0.548*** 0.992***   
 (0.515) (0.201) (0.387) (0.248) (0.186) (0.096) (0.270)   
Market-to-book equity         0.582* 0.433* 
        (0.332) (0.228) 
Financial constraints  -0.340 -0.108*** -0.279*** -0.014 -0.095*** -0.032** -0.077 -0.209* -0.246*** 
 (0.235) (0.031) (0.083) (0.031) (0.025) (0.015) (0.056) (0.108) (0.077) 
Interest coverage 0.070 0.047*** 0.017 -0.002 0.034*** -0.001 -0.021*** 0.022 0.027*** 
 (0.048) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
Financial slack 1.885 0.592* 1.066*** 0.426 1.183*** -0.274* -0.206 -0.360 -0.198 
 (1.320) (0.338) (0.388) (0.272) (0.232) (0.153) (0.161) (0.332) (0.221) 
CapEx-to-sales ratio 36.451 29.775*** -7.899 -8.537 5.947 5.127 -12.270* 17.227* 17.661** 
 (26.793) (8.485) (21.128) (14.477) (5.453) (3.866) (6.614) (9.931) (7.025) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.505 -1.061*** -0.321 -0.100 0.499*** -0.363** 0.378** -0.430 -0.678*** 
 (0.686) (0.315) (0.477) (0.332) (0.191) (0.144) (0.156) (0.344) (0.239) 
Globalization index -0.027 0.042*** -0.006 0.006 -0.036*** 0.034*** 0.017 0.028 0.024 
 (0.045) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024) (0.018) 
Constant -7.990 13.460*** -2.460 0.348 1.489 12.796*** -0.178 4.196 9.571** 
 (7.915) (4.159) (3.238) (2.170) (3.101) (2.008) (3.939) (4.767) (3.748) 
Sargan-Hansen test P-value 0.326 0.423 0.509 0.167 0.434 0.654 0.613 0.959 0.608 
No. observations 14981 26697 18878 18912 22812 26090 14765 14709 14705 




Table 3 (Cont). CSR and Agency Concerns: Two Stage Least Square Regressions 
2SLS regression results for various ESG ratings. In the 1st stage regression (not reported), the dependent variables are cash holdings, free 
cash flows, capital expenditure, dividend payout ratio, and leverage, respectively, and the independent variables are the country-level revised 
anti-director rights index (ADRI) as in Spamann (2009), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) as in Djankov et al. (2008), the private enforcement 
of securities law index as in La Porta et al. (2006), the revised one-share one-vote rule (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) 
index as in Spamann (2010), the revised mandatory waivable dividend index as in Spamann (2010), and the direct ownership of large 
shareholders who hold more than 5% of the firm’s equity. In the second stage, the dependent variables are various ESG ratings, and the 
independent variables are the “predicted” cash holdings, free cash flows, CapEx, dividend payouts, and leverage, together with other 
control variables. Standard errors are adjusted for the second stage and clustered at the industry level. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 
10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
 Panel B. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall and subdimensional ratings) from the Vigeo corporate ESG sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 












Agency concerns        
Cash holding (scaled) -0.497 0.804 4.111 -1.817 -0.406 -0.762 -10.474 
 
(1.671) (1.988) (3.811) (2.541) (1.985) (1.454) (7.556) 
Free cash flow (scaled) -2.723* -4.341** -6.092* 0.176 -3.698** -2.758** 1.552 
 
(1.430) (1.701) (3.261) (2.175) (1.699) (1.224) (6.360) 
CapEx (scaled) -3.258 -0.327 4.618 -7.001* 0.969 -0.904 -23.217** 
 
(2.469) (2.938) (5.631) (3.755) (2.933) (2.173) (11.291) 
Dividends payout (winsorized) 0.136 0.258 0.323 0.205 0.124 -0.090 0.173 
 
(0.178) (0.212) (0.407) (0.271) (0.212) (0.161) (0.835) 
Leverage 0.785*** 0.195 1.421** 0.702* 0.886*** 0.372* 0.891 
 
(0.264) (0.314) (0.603) (0.402) (0.314) (0.219) (1.136) 
Control variables        
ROA 2.969*** 3.329*** 3.848 1.232 3.528*** 2.830*** 4.207 
 
(1.041) (1.238) (2.373) (1.583) (1.236) (0.947) (4.918) 
Financial constraints -0.459 0.315 1.208 -0.570 0.558 -0.104 -4.575* 
 
(0.597) (0.710) (1.361) (0.908) (0.709) (0.510) (2.651) 
Financial slack -14.458 2.372 -1.280 -20.341 -18.142 -8.706 -73.506 
 
(10.451) (12.434) (23.835) (15.894) (12.417) (9.883) (51.924) 
CapEx-to-Sales ratio 0.366 -0.451 -1.273 1.394* -0.494 -0.145 4.509* 
 
(0.549) (0.653) (1.252) (0.835) (0.652) (0.489) (2.540) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 2.857 -8.402 1.526 2.007 3.914 4.367 11.291 
 (5.354) (6.371) (12.212) (8.143) (6.361) (4.240) (22.033) 
Globalization index 0.169 0.156 0.599 -0.064 0.123 0.239 -0.918 
 (0.371) (0.441) (0.845) (0.563) (0.440) (0.347) (1.801) 
Constant -40.795 86.301 -158.932 -2.717 -58.098 -30.309 124.078 
 
(92.024) (109.491) (209.883) (139.954) (109.335) (80.498) (418.261) 
Sargan-Hansen test P-value 0.996 0.449 0.086 0.850 0.035 0.187 0.263 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 





Table 4. CSR and Executive Pay-for-Performance 
The dependent variable is the average pay for all executives that are recorded in the BoardEx database, scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dependent 
variable for each specification is the equity-based compensation. 
Panel A. The MSCI Intangible Value Assessment sample 
Different ESG indices as independent 
variables: 
IVA rating EcoValue 
rating 










Tobin’s Q × CSR 0.010 0.170*** -0.039 0.258*** 0.302*** 0.260*** 0.195*** 0.207*** 0.306*** 0.150*** 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.084) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.044) 
CSR -0.153 0.232 -0.563 -0.680** 0.237 -0.196 1.473* 1.014 0.865 -0.027 
 (0.521) (0.446) (0.400) (0.329) (0.384) (0.353) (0.883) (0.808) (0.736) (0.541) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.990*** 1.012*** 1.245*** 1.013*** 0.932**** 0.858*** 0.795*** 0.769*** 0.750*** 0.868*** 
 (0.131) (0.140) (0.153) (0.151) (0.135) (0.141) (0.121) (0.129) (0.120) (0.130) 
Leverage -0.137*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.133*** -0.105*** -0.131*** -0.158*** -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.164*** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.035) (0.045) (0.039) (0.050) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) 
Analyst coverage -0.075 -0.018 0.046 -0.035 -0.001 -0.018 -0.208*** -0.160** -0.173** -0.115 
 (0.082) (0.070) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082) (0.071) (0.074) (0.080) (0.077) (0.084) 
Ln(Employees) -6.972*** -8.608*** -8.029*** -8.261*** -7.394*** -8.486*** -7.365*** -7.329*** -7.311*** -7.017*** 
 (0.795) (0.725) (0.714) (0.672) (0.739) (0.672) (0.868) (0.862) (0.816) (0.809) 
Largest shareholder’s ownership 0.046 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.068*** 0.102*** 0.084** 0.064** 0.066** 0.057* 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Independent director ratio -0.462*** -0.376*** -0.384*** -0.398*** -0.343*** -0.388*** -0.464*** -0.456*** -0.461*** -0.465*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) 
CEO gender (male) -9.898*** -0.386 -0.319 -1.563 -9.930*** -1.295 -10.529*** -11.958*** -11.304*** -12.592*** 
 (2.612) (4.411) (4.412) (4.262) (2.349) (4.436) (3.177) (2.838) (2.429) (2.601) 
CEO overseas work -3.437*** -2.490*** -1.327 -1.236 -1.197 -2.317*** -3.790*** -3.166*** -3.159*** -3.247*** 
 (0.785) (0.884) (0.842) (0.853) (0.927) (0.884) (0.825) (0.788) (0.800) (0.808) 
CEO overseas education 4.353*** 2.147** 2.619*** 2.639*** 1.958* 2.021** 4.489*** 4.271*** 4.801*** 4.282*** 
 (0.900) (0.968) (1.020) (1.013) (1.052) (0.992) (0.917) (0.897) (0.959) (0.886) 
Constant 78.049*** 62.863*** 61.935*** 65.908*** 62.324*** 65.355*** 72.331*** 73.417*** 74.433*** 80.129*** 
 (4.206) (5.434) (5.383) (4.903) (4.370) (5.338) (5.254) (5.251) (0.287) (4.443) 
No. of obs. 4419 5929 5234 5244 5399 5817 4357 4357 4419 4357 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4 (Cont). CSR and Executive Pay-for-Performance 
The dependent variable is the average pay for all executives that are recorded in the BoardEx database, scaled by total assets. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dependent variable for each specification is the equity-based compensation. 
Panel B. The Vigeo Corporate ESG sample 












Tobin’s Q × CSR 0.011** 0.009** 0.008 0.011*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
CSR -0.001 -0.025 -0.045* -0.022 -0.012 -0.085*** -0.015 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024) 
Tobin’s Q 0.033 0.088 0.138 0.023 -0.014 0.019 -0.241 
 (0.153) (0.063) (0.150) (0.153) (0.177) (0.157) (0.185) 
ROA 0.322*** 0.352*** 0.369*** 0.328*** 0.316*** 0.342*** 0.223*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.089) (0.084) (0.093) (0.082) 
Leverage 0.087 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.087 0.096 0.094 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) 
Ln(Employees) -1.931*** -1.848*** -1.751*** -1.867*** -2.013*** -1.744*** -1.919*** 
 (0.560) (0.535) (0.536) (0.557) (0.548) (0.519) (0.546) 
Analyst coverage -0.181*** -0.173 -0.175*** -0.180*** -0.171*** -0.159*** -0.173*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
Largest shareholders’ ownership -0.000 0.0004 0.001 0.0005 0.0004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Independent director ratio -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.113*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
CEO overseas work 0.426 0.347 0.275 0.381 0.035 0.390 0.741 
 (0.571) (0.571) (0.577) (0.572) (0.571) (0.573) (0.571) 
CEO overseas education -1.602** -1.650*** -1.852*** -1.650*** -1.639*** -1.545** -1.419** 
 (0.626) (0.626) (0.613) (0.631) (0.630) (0.618) (0.627) 
Female CEO 2.087 2.220 2.168 2.113 2.534 2.117 0.738 
 (6.375) (6.354) (6.231) (6.339) (6.523) (6.192) (6.314) 
Constant 27.138*** 27.419*** 27.474*** 27.683*** 27.475*** 28.478*** 24.548*** 
 (3.766) (3.834) (3.771) (3.767) (3.778) (4.051) (3.776) 
No. of obs. 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5. Direct Effects of Legal Protection of Shareholder Rights on CSR 
The dependent variables are various ESG indices, and the key explanatory variables are the adjusted anti-director rights index (ADRI), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI), and the public enforcement of the 
anti-self-dealing regulation. Control variables include legal origins (French, German, and Scandinavian; the English origin is taken as benchmark and omitted from regressions), logarithm of GDP per 
capita, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, financial constraints, interest coverage, current ratio, the ownership dispersion indicator, investment opportunities, and year and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level and reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings and subdimensional ratings) from the MSCI IVA sample 
 IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating Labor relations Industry-specific carbon risks Environmental opportunities 
Adjusted ADRI 0.297***   0.333***   0.269***   0.243***   0.221***   0.151***   
 (0.110)   (0.060)   (0.055)   (0.070)   (0.053)   (0.046)   
ASDI  1.329   1.966***   1.184   1.003   1.302**   0.967***  
  (1.325)   (0.676)   (1.174)   (0.940)   (0.489)   (0.307)  
Public enforcement    0.753***   0.158   0.725***   0.523***   0.004   -0.018 
   (0.229)   (0.211)   (0.208)   (0.169)   (0.202)   (0.128) 
No. of obs. 25449 25549 25549 48858 48958 48958 32495 32483 32483 32504 32604 32604 40508 40606 40606 47976 48075 48075 
Control variables  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R-squared 13.5% 12.2% 12.9% 18.3% 17.5% 16.3% 10.7% 9.5% 10.4% 14.0% 13.2% 13.5% 41.3% 41.6% 41.2% 27.3% 27.2% 27.0% 
       
Panel B. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall and subdimensional ratings) from the Vigeo corporate ESG sample 
 Overall ESG Environment Human resources Customers & suppliers Human rights Community involvement 
Adjusted ADRI 1.969***   2.789***   3.363***   0.980   2.558***   2.622***   
 (0.585)   (0.520)   (1.123)   (0.674)   (0.811)   (0.762)   
ASDI  -5.395   7.104   0.665   -3.116   -4.828   -7.227  
  (9.169)   (10.904)   (11.472)   (9.148)   (9.046)   (10.608)  
Public enforcement   -0.323   -2.337   0.698   -1.623   0.908   1.325 
   (1.516)   (1.711)   (2.255)   (1.376)   (1.688)   (1.384) 
No. of obs. 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 
Control variables  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  





Table 6. Direct Effects of Large Shareholders’ Ownership and Control on CSR 
The dependent variables are various ESG indices from the ASSET4 sample, and the key explanatory variables are the largest shareholder’s cash flow rights (ownership) and its square, and the wedge 
between the largest shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow rights. Wedge1 stands for voting rights minus cash flow rights, wedge2 stands for the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights. Control 
variables include market-to-book ratio of equity (winsorized at 5%), the logarithm of total assets (size), the logarithm of firm age, annual sales growth rate (winsorized at 1%), and CapEx to sales ratio 
(winsorized at 1%). All regressions control for country, industry, and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for significant 
at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings, environmental ratings, and social ratings) from the ASSET4 sample 
 
Overall CSR Rating Environmental Rating Social Rating 
Ownership and Control             
Wedge1 (Voting Rights - Ownership) -0.118***  -0.089**  -0.072**  -0.066*  -0.088***  -0.079**  
 
(0.032)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.035)  
Wedge2 (Voting Rights/ Ownership)  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership -0.274*** -0.278*** -0.310*** -0.315*** -0.223*** -0.215*** -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.175*** -0.181*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.073) (0.073) (0.053) (0.054) (0.079) (0.078) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.076) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership Square 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) ()0.001 
Control Variables             
Equity Market-to-Book 0.129 0.121 0.375** 0.376** -0.046 -0.052 0.352* 0.350* 0.168 0.162 0.470** 0.472** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.189) (0.189) (0.132) (0.132) (0.181) (0.182) (0.135) (0.136) (0.197) (0.198) 
Log(Size)   7.261*** 7.265***   7.689*** 7.691***   7.195*** 7.199*** 
   (0.486) (0.486)   (0.462) (0.461)   (0.474) (0.473) 
Log(Age)   3.940*** 3.962***   2.647*** 2.657***   2.919*** 2.945*** 
   (0.614) (0.615)   (0.607) (0.607)   (0.617) (0.617) 
Annual Sales Growth Rate   0.002 0.002   -0.015*** -0.015***   -0.013** -0.013** 
   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006) 
CapEx to Sales Ratio   -0.077** -0.077**   0.012 0.012   -0.048 -0.048 
   (0.034) (0.033)   (0.040) (0.040)   (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant   -64.214*** -64.822***   -44.976*** -45.233***   -39.148*** -39.790*** 
   (7.664) (7.665)   (8.071) (8.046)   (7.384) (7.372) 
No. of Observations 18905 18894 9064 9060 19467 19456 9193 9189 19467 19456 9193 9189 
Country, Industry, Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 7. CSR, Entrenchment, and Firm Value: ASSET4 Sample 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (the ratio of equity market capitalization to equity book value) winsorized at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the sum of the following dummy 
variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover 
provisions, treating non-available values as missing. Entrenchment Index 2 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 1, but treating non-available values as zeros. Entrenchment Index 3 has 
the same composition as Entrenchment Index 2 (also treating non-available values as zeros), except that “classified board” (directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered board” (directors’ 
terms are uniform). CSR is measured by ASSET4’s overall CSR rating for columns (1)—(3), ASSET4’s aggregate environmental rating for columns (4)—(6), and ASSET4’s aggregate social rating for 
columns (7)—(9). All specifications include country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  
Panel A. The World Sample 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0724   -0.0761**   -0.0864**   
 (0.0474)   (0.0384)   (0.0429)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0767**   -0.0707***   -0.0780***  
  (0.0318)   (0.0274)   (0.0299)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0689**   -0.0618**   -0.0805*** 
   (0.0296)   (0.0254)   (0.0275) 
CSR 0.0023 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0013 0.0016* 0.0014 
 (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.001) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0009 0.0011** 0.0008* 0.0014** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0014** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log(Assets) -0.2287*** -0.2775*** -0.2772*** -0.3385*** -0.2694*** -0.2692*** -0.3437*** -0.2784*** -0.2784*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0372) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0376) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership -0.0004 0.0017 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership Square 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Leverage -0.0044 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0046 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0045 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.004) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Dividend Per Share 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ROE 0.0161 0.0227 0.0226 0.0164 0.0230 0.0229 0.0162 0.0229 0.0229 
 (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 6527 16077 16077 6566 16278 16278 6566 16278 16278 




Table 7 (Cont). CSR, Entrenchment, and Firm Value: ASSET4 Sample 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (the ratio of equity market capitalization to equity book value) winsorized at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the sum of the following dummy 
variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover 
provisions, treating non-available values as missing. Entrenchment Index 2 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 1, but treating non-available values as zeros. Entrenchment Index 3 has 
the same composition as Entrenchment Index 2 (also treating non-available values as zeros), except that “classified board” (directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered board” (directors’ 
terms are uniform). CSR is measured by ASSET4’s overall CSR rating for columns (1)—(3), ASSET4’s aggregate environmental rating for columns (4)—(6), and ASSET4’s aggregate social rating for 
columns (7)—(9). All specifications include country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel B. The Subsample of Dispersed Ownership Countries: U.S., U.K., and Australia 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0516   -0.0418   -0.0629   
 (0.0528)   (0.0422)   (0.0479)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0847**   -0.0600*   -0.0810**  
  (0.0419)   (0.0341)   (0.0387)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0822**   -0.0540*   -0.0900** 
   (0.0390)   (0.0317)   (0.0353) 
CSR 0.0022 0.0022 0.0020 0.0021 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0014 0.0006 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0006 0.0012* 0.0011* 0.0008 0.0012** 0.0009 0.0011 0.0014** 0.0015** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Control Variables and Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 4649 8782 8782 4676 8872 8872 4676 8872 8872 
R-squared 25.1% 23.2% 23.2% 25.1% 22.9% 22.9% 25.3% 23.1% 23.1% 
Panel C. The Subsample of Dispersed Ownership Countries: U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0731   -0.0599   -0.0827*   
 (0.0497)   (0.0402)   (0.0449)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0967***   -0.0691**   -0.0936***  
  (0.0357)   (0.0298)   (0.0327)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0886***   -0.0587**   -0.0962*** 
   (0.0327)   (0.0274)   (0.0296) 
CSR 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016 0.0011 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 0.0005 
 (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0010 0.0014*** 0.0012** 0.0011* 0.0012** 0.0009** 0.0015** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Control Variables and Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 5373 11426 11426 5412 11572 11572 5412 11572 11572 





Appendix 1a. MSCI Intangible Value Assessment Data Description 
IVA Factor IVA Subscore weight Key Metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1) Strategy  <2% Overall governance; rating composed of total scores of non-Key Issues  
SG2) Strategic Capability  <2% Management of CSR issues, partnership in multi-stakeholder initiatives  
SG3) Traditional 
Governance Concerns  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, compensation 
practices, controversies involving executive compensation and governance. 
Human capital HC1) Workplace 
Practices  
<2% Workforce diversity, policies and programs to promote diversity, work/life 
benefits, discrimination-related controversies 
HC2) Labor Relations 20% KEY ISSUE: Labor Relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk of work stoppages, etc. 
HC3) Health & Safety  <2% H&S policies and systems, implementation and monitoring of those systems, 





<2% Customer initiatives, customer-related controversies, firm’s support for public 
policies with noteworthy benefits for stakeholders  
SC2) Local Communities  <2% Policies, systems and initiatives involving local communities (esp. indigenous 
peoples), controversies related to firm’s interactions with communities  
SC3) Supply Chain <2% Policies and systems to protect supply-chain workers’ and contractors’ rights, 
initiatives toward improving labor conditions, supply-chain-related controversies  
Products and 
services 
PS1) Intellectual Capital/ 
Product Development  
<2% Beneficial products and services, including efforts that benefit the 
disadvantaged, reduce consumption of energy and resources, and production of 
hazardous chemicals; average of two scores  
PS2) Product Safety  <2% Product quality, health and safety initiatives, controversies related to the quality 
or safety of a firm’s products, including legal cases, recalls, criticism  
Emerging 
markets 
EM1) EM Strategy  <2% Default = 5, unless there is company specific exposure that is highly significant   
EM2) Human Rights/ 
Child and Forced Labor  
<2% Policies, support for values in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
initiatives to promote human rights, human rights controversies  
EM3) Oppressive regimes  <2% Controversies, substantive involvement in countries with poor HR records  
Environmental 
risk factors 
ER1) Historic Liabilities <2% Controversies including natural resource-related cases, widespread or egregious 
environmental impacts  
ER2) Operating Risk <2% Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of toxic chemicals, nuclear 




<2% Water management and use, use of recycled materials, sourcing, sustainable 
resource management, climate change policy and transparency, climate change 
initiatives, absolute and normalized emissions output, controversies  
ER4) Industry Carbon 
Specific Risk  
25% KEY ISSUE: Carbon 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all operations, 
environmental management systems, regulatory compliance, controversies  
EMC2) Corporate 
Governance  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, compensation 
practices, controversies involving executive compensation and governance.  
EMC3) Environmental 
Management Systems  
<2% Establishment and monitoring of environmental performance targets, presence 
of environmental training, stakeholder engagement  
EMC4) Audit <2% External independent audits of environmental performance  
EMC5) Environmental 
Accounting/Reporting  
<2% Reporting frequency, reporting quality  
EMC6) Environmental 
Training & Development  
<2% Presence of environmental training and communications programs for 
employees  
EMC7) Certification <2% Certifications by ISO or other industry- and country-specific third party auditors  
EMC8) Products/ 
Materials  
<2% Positive and negative impact of products & services, end-of-life product 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all operations and reduce 
environmental impact of operations, products & services, environmental 
management systems, regulatory compliance  
EO2) Environmental 
Opportunity  
35% KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, R&D relative to sales and trend, 
innovation capacity   




Appendix 1b. Vigeo Corporate ESG Data Description 
Key domain Subdimension Description 
Environment ENV1.1 Environmental strategy and eco-design 
 ENV1.2 Pollution prevention and control 
 ENV1.3 Development of Green products and services 
 ENV1.4 Protection of biodiversity 
 ENV2.1 Protection of water resources 
 ENV2.2 Minimizing environmental impacts from energy use 
 ENV2.3 Environmental supply chain management 
 ENV2.4 Management of atmospheric emissions 
 ENV2.5 Waste management 
 ENV2.6 Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise 
 ENV2.7 Management of environmental impacts from transportation 
 ENV3.1 Management of environmental impacts from the use and disposal of products/services 
Human 
resources 
HRS1.1 Promotion of labor relations 
HRS1.2 Encouraging employee participation 
 HRS2.1 Career Development 
 HRS2.2 Training and Development 
 HRS2.3 Responsible management of restructurings 
 HRS2.4 Carrer management and promotion of employability 
 HRS3.1 Quality of remuneration systems 
 HRS3.2 Improvement of health and safety conditions 
 HRS3.3 Respect and management of working hours 
Business 
behavior 
C&S1.1 Product safety 
C&S1.2 Information to customers 
(Customer & 
supplier) 
C&S1.3 Responsible Contractual Agreement 
C&S2.1 Integration of CSR in purchasing processes 
 C&S2.2 Sustainable Relationship with suppliers 
 C&S2.3 Integration of environmental factors in the supply chain 
 C&S2.4 Integration of social factors in the supply chain 
 C&S3.1 Prevention of corruption 
 C&S3.2 Prevention of anti-competitive practices 
 C&S3.3 Transparency and integrity of influence strategies and practices 
Human rights HR1.1 Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations 
 HR2.1 Respect for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
 HR2.2 Elimination of child labour 
 HR2.3 Abolition of forced labour 
 HR2.4 Non-discrimination 
Community 
involvement 
CIN1.1 Promotion of social and economic development 
CIN2.1 Social impacts of company’s products and services 
 CIN2.2 Contribution to general interest causes 
Corporate 
governance 
CGV1.1 Board of directors 
CGV2.1 Audit and Internal Controls 
 CGV3.1 Shareholders’ Rights 
 CGV4.4 Executive Remuneration 





Appendix 2a. MSCI Intangible Value Assessment Country Coverage 













Australia 2.95 2.75 2.97 2,877 240 Morocco 1.00 0.67 1.33 3 1 
Austria 3.44 3.13 3.23 370 14 Netherlands 3.35 3.62 3.29 1,496 34 
Belgium 2.98 2.97 3.00 680 19 New Zealand 2.70 2.95 2.97 256 13 
Bermuda Islands 2.02 1.35 2.06 283 16 Norway 4.06 4.35 3.94 485 16 
Brazil 2.68 3.28 2.68 
 
426 33 Pakistan 1.50 1.25 1.75 4 2 
Canada 3.24 2.87 3.26 3,347 129 Papua New Guinea 2.62 2.00 3.05 21 2 
Cayman Islands 2.60 1.94 2.95 101 3 Peru 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Chile 1.59 1.50 1.72 46 9 Philippines 0.04 0.89 0.04 28 1 
China 0.54 0.46 0.63 181 35 Poland 2.03 1.55 1.76 194 7 
Colombia 2.00 2.67 2.33 3 2 Portugal 2.67 2.60 2.12 451 11 
Cyprus 4.00 3.00 4.00 5 1 Puerto Rico 1.06 1.53 1.06 32 1 
Czech Republic 2.43 2.38 2.73 124 22 Romania 1.00 0.78 1.00 23 1 
Denmark 3.43 3.31 3.33 
 
843 22 Russia 0.79 0.64 1.07 227 19 
Egypt 1.71 0.76 1.65 17 3 Singapore 2.03 2.08 2.08 740 40 
Finland 3.85 3.78 
 
3.84 927 27 South Africa 4.26 3.50 4.33 167 17 
France 3.95 3.39 3.62 3,660 89 Spain 3.48 3.08 3.45 1,610 45 
Germany 3.83 4.06 3.74 2,779 66 Sweden 4.19 4.09 4.11 1,600 42 
Greece 2.23 2.05 2.14 554 16 Switzerland 3.18 3.10 3.11 3,184 60 
Hong Kong, China 1.79 1.96 1.92 1,447 62 Taiwan, China 2.15 2.04 2.19 156 17 
Hungary 1.74 1.83 1.63 95 4 Thailand 2.53 1.04 2.58 82 6 
India 2.03 1.66 2.09 150 26 Turkey 2.20 1.13 2.04 109 7 
Indonesia 1.47 0.53 1.59 34 4 United Arab Emirates 1.00 3.00 1.00 1 1 
Ireland 1.89 2.09 1.88 892 24 United Kingdom 3.62 3.24 3.52 14,203 315 
Israel 1.09 1.64 1.09 78 11 United States 2.38 2.44 2.45 31,819 778 
Italy 
 
2.31 1.99 2.33 2149 54       
Japan 2.57 3.67 2.59 11,270 384 (Not included in the World Bank data)  
Korea, South 2.59 2.96 2.61 466 28 British Virgin Islands 1.00 2.00 0.00 1 1 
Luxembourg 1.96 2.65 1.99 145 9 Guernsey 2.03 1.28 1.80 87 2 
Macao, China 2.00 4.00 1.50 2 2 Gibraltar 3.00 2.48 3.09 23 2 
Malaysia 1.47 1.18 1.90 154 14 Jersey 1.27 1.08 1.31 26 3 
Mexico 2.05 2.69 2.18 239 17 (Total: 59 countries)    91,373  




Appendix 2b.Vigeo ESG Country Coverage 

















Australia 34.91 25.12 22.08 34.71 32.86 37.69 56.72 154 72 
Austria 28.72 23.95 29.32 35.22 29.40 32.02 40.28 57 16 
Belgium 35.45 36.78 38.65 38.49 39.10 41.28 41.25 120 22 
Bermuda 30.00 21.00 33.00 38.00 55.00 19.00 39.00 1 1 
China 14.80 4.80 6.20 20.60 25.60 23.60 22.00 5 3 
Canada 35.20 26.29 24.70 37.53 38.07 41.45 51.54 133 52 
Denmark 29.60 27.62 29.59 36.18 30.75 35.76 34.30 97 27 
Finland 40.15 40.49 41.72 42.55 33.24 42.37 50.89 123 24 
France 42.40 41.22 47.18 48.15 47.53 45.91 43.66 1038 121 
Germany 40.55 43.29 43.91 46.25 42.25 44.37 45.11 508 75 
Greece 27.61 26.54 27.81 30.10 33.32 34.37 29.67 57 12 
Hong Kong, China 23.36 15.22 15.31 25.05 22.50 27.06 35.53 96 43 
Iceland 21.50 5.75 8.00 22.25 9.75 33.75 39.00 4 4 
Ireland 27.08 22.85 25.59 30.04 31.95 35.07 51.56 97 18 
Italy 36.75 34.28 40.97 41.62 39.85 42.94 12.09 291 52 
Japan 25.19 27.47 19.39 31.87 26.25 33.46 16.37 655 290 
Luxembourg 33.31 29.03 35.90 40.00 43.30 40.57 44.60 30 5 
Netherlands 42.65 43.19 42.35 45.35 47.67 48.55 53.85 288 47 
New Zealand 29.43 28.86 17.43 27.14 19.86 29.14 48.86 7 3 
Norway 40.94 34.00 39.90 48.14 38.96 41.10 51.60 67 19 
Portugal 35.86 35.15 37.90 37.60 42.97 43.08 36.00 61 10 
Russia 32.00 31.00 20.00 18.00 16.00 43.00 56.00 2 1 
Singapore 25.62 16.16 14.35 23.84 23.84 27.89 44.19 37 17 
Spain 36.52 36.40 38.60 40.91 40.85 41.97 41.87 259 51 
Sweden 37.10 35.76 32.99 45.71 32.41 42.29 42.08 194 43 
Switzerland 37.02 35.79 32.45 40.49 36.04 40.72 44.44 301 54 
United Kingdom 42.24 39.47 33.14 42.04 45.85 42.65 64.77 1,157 255 



























Abu Dhabi 19.65 38.32 25.68 12 1 Kuwait 18.92 24.30 36.60 48 4 
Austria 43.29 38.13 38.77 4,020 335 Luxembourg 55.00 58.48 52.83 60 5 
Australia 44.46 51.84 50.40 252 21 Malaysia 42.32 41.12 50.21 540 45 
Belgium 53.16 54.88 49.63 336 28 Mexico 38.96 46.03 49.47 324 27 
Brazil 55.02 55.19 67.72 1,008 84 Morocco 21.57 20.13 53.42 36 3 
Canada 47.59 37.64 38.65 3,864 322 Netherlands 75.30 68.86 75.36 540 45 
Channel Islands 52.05 49,82 53.02 24 2 New Zealand 49.47 45.42 42.40 144 12 
Chile 33.41 43.66 45.61 252 21 Nigeria 7.18 10.89 19.71 12 1 
China 25.59 33.38 32.78 984 82 Norway 56.90 55.26 58.87 300 25 
Colombia 34.40 34.52 40.94 108 9 Oman 27.00 27.42 33.00 12 1 
Cyprus 39.18 30.20 36.71 12 1 Peru 41.33 31.05 34.41 12 1 
Czech Republic 48.56 48.72 60.01 48 4 Philippines 39.59 36.07 40.79 252 21 
Denmark  48.45 56.43 52.69 324 27 Poland 33.22 33.62 42.06 312 26 
Dubai 37.39 44.24 33.76 12 1 Portgual 67.52 66.20 73.95 144 12 
Egypt 14.55 19.29 27.22 132 11 Quatar 10.77 12.87 24.64 24 2 
Finland 72.26 73.25 66.86 324 27 Russian Federation 37.52 39.92 50.64 408 34 
France 71.45 75.70 76.36 1,212 101 Saudi Arabia 19.22 32.12 25.65 72 6 
Germany 58.25 67.07 67.16 1,068 89 Singapore 34.66 33.58 35.60 648 54 
Greece 35.42 47.10 49.62 300 25 South Africa 66.17 56.74 73.06 1,092 91 
Hong Kong, China 30.27 33.72 35.51 1,800 150 South Korea 47.12 62.00 56.77 1,212 101 
Hungary 73.29 76.18 80.80 48 4 Spain 66.26 68.54 73.82 696 58 
Iceland 29.02 20.45 36.06 36 3 Sri Lanka 51.25 51.09 66.59 12 1 
India 47.16 51.60 57.93 960 80 Sweden 62.79 66.58 63.91 660 55 
Indonesia 45.46 41.95 60.83 300 25 Switzerland 57.88 58.71 56.98 852 71 
Ireland 43.04 42.65 39.33 216 18 Taiwan, China  29.02 44.74 36.30 1,536 128 
Israel 38.44 42.65 39.33 168 14 Thailand 55.76 47.93 56.73 264 22 
Italy  52.92 53.05 62.93 708 59 Turkey 44.33 48.36 52.90 288 24 
Japan  38.18 61.62 45.47 5,196 433 United Kingdom 64.32 59.63 63.16 4,776 398 
Jordan 52.16 60.71 62.99 12 1 United States 51.91 40.22 44.17 14,436 1203 










The anti-director rights index (ADRI) was first developed in La Porta et al. (1998) as a measure of investor protection 
against corporate management, and later on revised in Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). All the three 
ADRIs consist of the same six key components: (1) proxy by mail allowed; (2) shares not blocked before shareholder 
meeting; (3) cumulative voting/ proportional representation; (4) oppressed minority protection; (5) preemptive rights 
to new share issues; (6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each component is a 
dummy variable and the ADRI is formed by aggregating the value of all six components. The index ranges from 0 to 
6, whereby a higher value of the index indicates stronger shareholder protection. Source: LLSV (1998); La Porta et al. 
(2008); Spamann (2010). 
Anti-self-dealing 
index (ASDI) 
The anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) was developed by Djankov et al. (2008) and is an average of ex ante and ex post 
private control of self-dealing. The ex ante private control of self-dealing transactions includes approval by 
disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosure by the buyer, the insider, and independent review. The ex post 
private control of self-dealing transactions include the disclosure in periodic filings and the ease of proving wrong 






voting and cash 
flow) 
Equals one if the company law or commercial code of the country requires that ordinary shares carry one vote per 
share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, this variable equals one when the law prohibits the existence of both 
multiple-voting and nonvoting ordinary shares and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per 
shareholder irrespective of the number of shares owned, and zero otherwise. “Ordinary shares” means all shares that 
do not carry a preference of any kind, neither for dividends nor for liquidation. For voting rights, a literal 
interpretation is adopted, under which the equal number of votes, not the proportionality of votes and cash-flow 
rights is decisive. In addition, strict proportionality between voting and cash-flow rights is required. Source: LLSV 




Equals the percentage of net income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to distribute as 
dividends among ordinary stockholders. It takes a value of zero for countries without such a restriction. The 




Index of public enforcement if all disclosure and approval requirements have been met. Ranges from 0 to 1. One-
quarter point when each of the following sanction is available: (1) fines for the approving body, (2) jail sentences for 




The combination of the disclosure requirements index and the liability standard index. The disclosure 
requirements index includes six sub-dimensions: (1) prospectus; (2) compensations of directors and key 
officers; (3) shareholders ownership structure; (4) insider ownership; (5) irregular contracts; and (6) transactions 
between the securities issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”). Source: 




The index of public enforcement is the average of five subindices related to the “Supervisor” of securities 
regulation: (1) supervisor characteristics index, including appointment, tenure, and focus; (2) rule-making power 
index, including the power of the supervisor to issue regulations regarding primary offerings and listing rules on 
stock exchanges; (3) investigative powers index, including document and witness; (4) orders index, including 
orders issuer, orders distributor, and orders accountant; (5) criminal index, including criminal director, criminal 
distributor, and criminal accountant. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank. 
Cash holding The amount of cash and cash equivalent on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Free cash flows Computed as EBIT multiplied by (1 – tax rate), and plus the Depreciation & Amortization, and then minus Change 
in Working Capital, and then minus Capital Expenditure, finally scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Capital 
expenditure 
The capital expenditure recorded on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
Calculated as the common dividends divided by net income, as recorded on the company’s financial statement. 
Source: Datastream. 
Leverage  Calculated as the book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total equity of the company (MSCI and 
Vigeo samples), or the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets of the company 






Executives’ compensation including salaries and cash bonuses, stock options, equity-linked LTIP cash plan, equity-
linked LTIP option plan, equity-linked LTIP share plan, LTIP share matching plan, etc. The score is then calculated 
by averaging the equity based compensation of all executives reported in BoardEx for the focal company. Source: 
BoardEx Director Report. 
Analyst coverage The number of analyst forecast reports for the focal company. Source: I/B/E/S. 
Employee  The total number of employees of the company. Source: Compustat. 
Market 
capitalization 
The total market value of equity of the company. Source: Datastream. 
Blockholders’ 
direct ownership 
The cumulative direct ownership of all shareholders who directly hold over 5% of the company’s shares. Source: 




The total ownership (both direct and indirect) held by the largest shareholder of the company. Thw ownership data 
are cross-sectional and reflect the most recent information at the time of collecting these data. Source: Datastream 
and Orbis. 
Control wedge The ratio of the voting rights to the ownership for the largest shareholder of the company. Wedge1 stands for the 
difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. Wedge2 stands for the ratio 
of the voting rights to the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. Source: Datastream. 
Independent 
director ratio 
The ratio of the number of all independent directors to the number of all directors on the board. Source: BoardEx. 
Female CEO The dummy variable equals one if the CEO of the company is female. Source: BoardEx. 
CEO international 
work 




The dummy variable equals one if the CEO received education degrees overseas. Source: BoardEx. 
ROA Return on assets: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of the company. Source: Compustat. 
Financial 
constraints 
Measured by the ratio of the change in short-term investment to the change in operational cash flow. Source: 
Compustat. 
Interest coverage Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expenses. Source: Compustat. 
Financial slack Current debts divided by current assets. Source: Compustat. 
CapEx to sales 
ratio 
The ratio of capital expenditure to the total sales revenue, a measure following Berger and Ofek (1995). Source: 
Compustat. 
Firm size The book value of total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat. 
Firm age The number of years since the firm's year of incorporation. Source: Datastream. 
Dividend per 
share 
Rolling 12 month dividend per share (adjusted). It is intended to represent the anticipated payment over the 
following 12 months and for that reason may be calculated on a rolling 12-month basis, or as the "indicated" annual 
amount, or it may be a forecast. Special or once-off dividends are generally excluded. Dividends per share are 
displayed gross, inclusive of local tax credits where applicable, except for France, Belgium, Ireland and the UK, 
where dividends per share are displayed net. Source: Datastream. 
ROE Return on equity: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Annual sales 
growth rate 




The percentage ownership of the single biggest owner (by voting power). Source: Datastream (ASSET4). 
Sustainable 
country rating 
Country-level sovereign ESG scores and benchmarks based on 120 ESG risk and performance indicators in three 
domains: (1) environmental protection, (2) social protection and solidarity, (3) rule of law and governance. Countries 
are graded on a scale of 100 on their commitment and performance in these indicators (e.g., ratification of the Kyoto 







Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), the 
Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the period 2002-2013, and 
is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample based on the presence of: (1) a poison 
pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a upermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and 
(5) other anti-takeover provisions. Non-available values are treated as missing. Source: Datastream. 
Entrenchment 
Index 2 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), the 
Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the period 2002-2013, and 
is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample based on the presence of: (1) a poison 
pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, 
and (5) other anti-takeover provisions. Missing values are treated as zeros. Source: Datastream. 
Entrenchment 
Index 3 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), the 
Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the period 2002-2013, and 
is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample based on the presence of: (1) a poison 
pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a staggered board 
(the terms of board members are uniform), and (5) other anti-takeover provisions. Missing values are treated as 
zeros. Source: Datastream. 
 
